











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/145542                   
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 




Micro-Foundations of R&D Alliance Formation:  
The Interplay of Scientist Mobility and the Cooperative Context of Collaboration 
 
 
Abstract. Alliance research emphasizes that firms can access R&D collaboration opportunities when they 
enjoy relational or geographic embeddedness with potential partners. But, how can firms that are not 
embedded with prospective partners establish alliances? We emphasize the micro-foundations of R&D 
alliance formation and propose that scientist mobility is an important substitutive mechanism that helps 
foster collaboration opportunities between firms that are poorly embedded. Specifically, we posit and 
show that in high-tech industries, scientist mobility is more facilitative for R&D alliance formation when 
potential partners lack relational ties between them or are not geographically colocated. Our findings 
demonstrate how incorporation of the competitive labor market context and its interplay with the 
cooperative context changes the insights of a fundamental research stream emphasizing the importance of 










Prior research in R&D partner selection emphasized that firms' embeddedness along two distinct 
dimensions – relational and geographic – helps them access R&D alliance opportunities. Specifically, the 
relational view suggests that opportunities to collaborate stem from firms' prior pattern of 
interorganizational linkages (e.g., Ahuja 2000b; Powell et al. 1996). These linkages between potential 
partners are manifest as direct and indirect ties and reflect their cooperative embeddedness. Potential 
partners that share either direct or indirect ties enjoy familiarity with each other due to their prior 
linkages, so they can readily establish R&D alliances (e.g., Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). 
However, these different kinds of stable relationships are often not readily available for private, high-tech 
new ventures (e.g., Baum et al. 2000; Shane and Cable 2002). The geographic dimension of 
embeddedness reflects firms’ spatial proximity with potential partners and connectedness within a local 
institutional and cultural fabric that ensures steady access to information about each other via 
interpersonal communication networks (e.g., Hess 2004; Saxenian 1994). Thus, colocation of potential 
partners helps them discover and aggregate information about each other (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2015; 
Crandall et al. 2010; Hess 2004; Jaffe et al. 1993; Stigler 1961) and also promotes opportunities for 
establishing R&D alliances (e.g., Narula and Santangelo 2009; Reuer and Lahiri 2013). Given that R&D 
partner selection requires costly vetting of potential partners’ intangible resources, relational and 
geographic embeddedness can help partners overcome informational barriers and establish linkages. 
However, the question that emerges from this body of research is, how can technology ventures that lack 
such embeddedness access opportunities for R&D collaboration? 
To answer this research question, we rely on emerging research on the information-intermediation 
role of scientist mobility and its role in fostering interorganizational arrangements between firms (Collet 
and Hedström 2013; Mawdsley and Somaya 2016; Wagner and Goossen 2018). Mobile scientific 
personnel carry fine-grained information about firms’ technological activities and are likely to be valuable 
for high-tech ventures to learn about external opportunities (Hess and Rothaermel 2011). The mobility of 
scientific personnel is valuable in transmitting information between high-tech firms (Almeida and Kogut 
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1999; Arrow 1962; Singh 2005; Singh and Agrawal 2011) because scientists that migrate from one firm 
to another are likely to be informed and have knowledge about the underlying R&D resources and 
activities of the firms (Dokko et al. 2009; Palomeras and Melero 2010). The informational role of mobile 
scientists can help us better understand the micro-foundations of alliance formation involving high-tech 
ventures (Salvato et al. 2017). Recent research by Wagner and Goossen (2018) has demonstrated that 
mobile scientists can be instrumental in facilitating R&D alliances between their current and prior 
employers. In our study, we build upon and extend this research by developing the idea that scientist 
mobility is an important micro-organizational mechanism that can offset the absence of interfirm ties and 
geographic colocation in a venture’s cooperative context.  
Our study offers several contributions to the literature. Whereas previous alliance research 
primarily attends to the cooperative context of collaboration by emphasizing the role of relational and 
geographic embeddedness (e.g., Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Narula and Santangelo 2009), 
we emphasize scientist mobility in the factor market and show that it not only influences ventures’ 
likelihood of allying (Wagner and Goossen 2018), but it also alters the implications of interfirm ties and 
colocation emphasized in previous research. The fact that scientist mobility and, interfirm ties or 
colocation, may substitute for one another in fostering R&D alliances suggests that future research needs 
to attend to the competitive labor market context of collaboration rather than only the cooperative context, 
just as emerging research on labor market mobility needs to devote more attention to the cooperative 
context of collaboration and firms’ embeddedness. 
Our findings also replicate in a new context findings in recent research about the facilitative role of 
scientist mobility for R&D alliance formation (Wagner and Goossen 2018). Whereas that research 
focused on scientist mobility between the largest global pharmaceutical companies, we show how the 
mobility of scientists shapes opportunities for R&D alliances among high-tech new ventures in the 
biotechnology industry. Furthermore, our research reveals distinct boundary conditions that reflect 
partners’ lack of embeddedness and shows scientist mobility is a meaningful mechanism for R&D 
alliance formation between partners without relational or geographic embeddedness. Our findings also 
4 
 
demonstrate that scientist mobility is insignificant in fostering R&D collaboration when firms have prior 
ties or are geographically colocated. 
In our empirical analyses, we consider the potential endogeneity of scientist mobility in the high-
tech setting and employ novel exclusion restrictions (crime rates and weather conditions) for employee 
mobility, inspired by research from urban and labor economics, while employing the two-stage residual 
inclusion method (Rivers and Vuong 1988; Terza 2018; Terza et al. 2008). In doing so, we also 
demonstrate how research in urban and labor economics can be of use in addressing endogeneity in 
research that links labor market mobility and strategy. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
While R&D alliances help high-tech ventures overcome resource deficiencies and improve 
commercialization prospects, forming R&D alliances can be challenging for them. Lack of information 
about potential partners’ resources make R&D alliance formation difficult, so firms may become wary 
about adverse selection risks (Akerlof 1970), and R&D alliances among firms can fail to occur. To 
overcome these information inefficiencies, firms often tap into their existing interfirm relationships or 
consider nearby firms for R&D collaboration (Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Reuer and Lahiri 
2013). However, high-tech ventures often lack stable ties with other firms (Baum et al. 2000), or they find 
it difficult to look for partners beyond their locality (Narula and Santangelo 2009). High-tech ventures 
thus find it challenging to access collaborative opportunities with prospective partners and form alliances.  
Interfirm movement of employees can help firms discover new information and identify new 
opportunities (Casper 2007; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Mobility of scientific personnel transmits 
information between firms (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Arrow 1962; Singh 2005), and mobile scientists 
can serve as important information conduits for ventures as they carry information about the underlying 
R&D resources of the firms they worked for in the past (Palomeras and Melero 2010). They are 
particularly valuable for new ventures for accessing R&D alliance opportunities for several reasons.  
Scientific personnel typically hold first-hand information about a firm’s technological capabilities 
and activities (Wezel et al. 2006), thus creating opportunities for a firm to learn about the nature of 
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resources and activities at the employees’ prior employers (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Arrow 1962). 
Because of these informational advantages conferred through mobile scientists, managers of a venture 
considering an alliance are more likely to consult these scientists when deciding upon R&D 
collaborations. Managers become aware of the scientists’ domains of expertise and employment history 
already at the recruitment stage, as managers are typically involved in the recruitment of knowledge 
workers (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003). Evidence from the biotechnology industry demonstrates that 
scientists are often called upon to codify or translate scientific information for managerial use (Liebeskind 
et al. 1996). They also assume temporary administrative roles as R&D heads or become permanent 
members of executive groups (Schweizer 2005), suggesting the important role of scientists in evaluating 
the technological expertise and resources of prospective R&D partners. Moreover, many high-tech firms 
are young and of small size, with information exchange between scientific and managerial personnel 
occurring regularly and with some scientists even taking on executive roles (Higgins and Gulati 2006). 
They can therefore be an important mechanism for new ventures to discover opportunities for R&D 
collaboration and make partner selection decisions (Wagner and Goossen 2018).   
In the hypotheses developed below, we focus on the micro-foundations of R&D alliance formation 
and suggest that the informational advantages stemming from scientist mobility between prospective 
partners are particularly valuable for ventures that are poorly embedded in a network of prior interfirm 
ties or are not geographically colocated with prospective alliance partners. Therefore, whereas previous 
research has attended to the cooperative context of collaboration by emphasizing the role of interfirm ties 
and colocation, below we focus on the interplay between mobility in the labor market context and the 
cooperative context in fostering R&D alliances for high-tech ventures.   
Scientist Mobility and the Absence of Relational Ties 
The value of relational ties between partners has been extensively studied in alliance research. In 
particular, this research used an embeddedness perspective to argue that prior collaboration ties can act as 
a remedy for information disadvantages and can thereby diminish the risks involved in R&D alliance 
formation. For example, prior alliance agreements provide a means for prospective collaborators to 
6 
 
collect fine-grained information about each other’s technological know-how as well as research and 
development activities (Gulati 1995a; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Relatedly, prior ties help firms cope 
with uncertainties related to the disclosure of firm-specific information such as information about 
intangible assets that prevail in knowledge-intensive industries, yet are also difficult to value and discern 
from financial statements (Chi 1994). Previous alliances therefore enable prospective partners to 
accumulate rich information about each other’s current and future technological endeavors and develop 
deeper understandings about each other’s resources (Vanhaverbeke et al. 2002). In the context of R&D 
alliance formation, prior ties offer firms critical information on intangible assets such as R&D resources, 
which are not easily accessible by other firms (Almeida et al. 2002; Higgins and Rodriguez 2006).  
Similar advantages can be provided to firms via indirect ties that firms have through common 
partners. Indirect ties via shared alliance partners serve as conduits of information about the underlying 
R&D resources and competences of potential collaborators because a firm’s partner can provide 
information from their interactions with their other partners (Ahuja 2000b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). 
When indirectly connected through a shared alliance partner, prospective partners each have incentives to 
represent themselves accurately (Powell 1990), making the collection and interpretation of R&D 
information during due diligence less difficult and costly. Indirect ties between prospective alliance 
partners can thus serve as a means for both information-gathering and information-screening (Rangan 
2000). For example, firms with indirect ties may gather information about the success and failure of 
research efforts of prospective partners (Rogers and Kincaid 1981), but also screen, absorb and classify 
more information about prospective partners’ R&D resources and prospects than the information 
processing capability of an individual firm alone would allow (Leonard-Barton 1984). The R&D-related 
information transferred through shared third-party ties is made credible and interpretable because the 
shared partner provides reliability by acting as a referee. Indirect ties thus also allow prospective partners 
to evaluate each other’s network resources and infer whether partnering with one another could enable 
them to benefit from the other party’s embeddedness (Gulati 1999).  
Given that prior direct and indirect relationships provide firm access to significant information 
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about prospective collaborators’ R&D resources and activities, they diminish the role that information 
carried by mobile scientists can play for these same purposes. By contrast, absent prior relationships 
between firms, prospective partners can rely more upon mobile scientists to obtain information about one 
another’s R&D resources and activities. As a consequence, the informational benefits we posit for mobile 
scientists, in many ways, parallel those ascribed to relational ties by previous research, and we thus expect 
that prior relational ties and scientist mobility will substitute for each other in fostering R&D alliances.   
Hypothesis 1: The positive effect of scientist mobility on the likelihood of R&D alliance 
formation will be stronger when prospective partners lack relational ties. 
 
Scientist Mobility and the Absence of Colocation 
The value of spatial colocation has also been extensively studied in the research stream on alliances (e.g., 
Felzensztein et al. 2010; Narula and Santangelo 2009). In particular, this research has also used an 
embeddedness perspective to argue that physical closeness allows for frequent interactions and effective 
exchange of information between firms, thereby acting as a remedy for information disadvantages and the 
risks involved in R&D alliance formation. Being colocated engenders connectedness for firms within a 
local institutional and cultural fabric and ensures steady access to information about each other through 
interpersonal communication networks (e.g., Saxenian 1994).   
Previous research in economic geography and management has highlighted the economic 
significance of geographic proximity for firms as it helps them easily discover each other and aggregate 
information in several informal ways (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2015; Crandall et al. 2010; Hess 2004; Jaffe et 
al. 1993; Stigler 1961). For example, firms may enjoy social and professional gatherings, such as 
conferences and boot camps, which serve as conduits for information exchange about technological 
developments and emerging R&D opportunities (e.g., Liebeskind et al. 1996; Owen-Smith and Powell 
2004). Colocation enables face-to-face communication between organizational actors, which is critical to 
transferring tacit knowledge (Daft and Lengel 1986). Colocation may foster information exchange not 
only due to spatial proximity but also through the various information channels it provides, such as 
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employees joining community groups, residing in the same neighborhoods, or participating in local 
industry events (e.g., Almeida and Kogut 1999; Saxenian 1990). Such information exchange is especially 
important in high-tech industries, where business involves a high degree of tacit knowledge. These 
interactions can provide firms critical information on intangible assets of prospective partners, such as 
R&D resources or project trajectories, which are typically not easily accessible by other firms (e.g., 
Almeida et al. 2002; Higgins and Rodriguez 2006). Given the informational benefits of colocation, it may 
be of particular value for new ventures that are usually short of track records and have limited publicly 
available information. Colocation thereby help them convey information about their resources and 
prospects to potential partners as well as learn about them to access collaboration opportunities. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that geographic colocation and scientist mobility are distinct but 
partially redundant means for accessing information about potential R&D alliance partners. We expect 
that the information benefits from scientist mobility will substitute for the information benefits of 
colocation-enabled interactions in fostering R&D alliances. In other words, we argue that the role of 
scientist mobility in providing informational advantages becomes less useful for R&D alliance formation 
when firms are colocated. By contrast, when firms are not colocated, scientist mobility in the labor market 
is expected to have a greater bearing on R&D alliance formation to address the heightened information 
frictions that accompany greater geographic distance.  
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of scientist mobility on the likelihood of R&D alliance 
formation will be stronger when prospective partners are not colocated. 
 
Methodology 
Data and Sample 
To test these hypotheses, we focus on R&D alliances among ventures in the biotechnology industry. This 
industry is well recognized as a setting where access to resources that enable future development of a firm 
rests on alliances (Powell et al. 1996). However, discerning the value of a biotech venture as a potential 
alliance partner can be difficult because of its intangible resources and short business record (Stuart et al. 
1999). Because mobility of scientists is also a pervasive phenomenon in the biotech industry (Casper 
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2007), scientists that move between firms can serve as important information intermediaries that help new 
ventures learn about potential R&D alliance partners. Additionally, the intensity of patenting activity in 
this industry is high (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn 2006), providing a means to infer scientist mobility and 
firms’ technological resources from publicly-available patent records (Almeida and Kogut 1999). 
We collected data on alliances among biotechnology ventures using Clarivate Analytics’ Cortellis 
Deals Intelligence database during the fifteen-year period 1995-2009. This database, previously known as 
Thomson Reuters’ Recap database, is considered to be one of the most reliable and comprehensive data 
sources for alliance agreements in the biotechnology industry and has been used in prior strategy research 
to investigate cooperative strategies of biotech ventures (Schilling 2009). We applied several sample 
screening criteria to the alliance data. We limited our sample to alliances that have an R&D component 
(Oxley 1997), that is deals that the database classifies as research, collaboration, development or co-
development alliances, though deals might involve more than one type and also might involve other 
activities such as manufacturing and marketing. We also limited our sample to alliances between firms 
based in the United States in order to reduce unobserved heterogeneity from cross-border alliances. 
Further, we included only alliances between ventures that, five years prior to the focal alliance, had at 
least one patent granted by the patent office, as this allowed inferences to be drawn on scientist mobility 
from the patent data (Almeida and Kogut 1999). 
We hand-matched each firm from the Cortellis database with the corresponding assignee in the US 
Patent Inventor Database (Li et al. 2014) based on firm name. We used the US Patent Inventor Database 
from Harvard Dataverse to identify scientist mobility events because this source contains patent data with 
disambiguated patent inventor names. To identify scientist mobility events, we relied on the coding 
procedure developed in prior research (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010). For 
each firm in our sample, we examined the full set of patents available in the patent dataset from 1990 
onwards. We chronologically traced each individual scientist’s patenting history to determine instances 
where a scientist was employed by more than one firm over his or her patent trajectory. A mobility event 
was identified when a scientist was listed as an inventor in patents granted to two different firms, and the 
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corresponding year of mobility was calculated as the halfway point between the last patenting date at the 
originating firm and the first patenting date at the destination firm (Singh and Agrawal 2011).  
We also followed prior research in undertaking steps to minimize potential errors with respect to 
the identification and timing of scientist mobility events (Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010; Singh and 
Agrawal 2011). Specifically, we verified that patents suggesting potential scientist mobility events were 
not granted to more than one firm. We also examined in detail each instance when a scientist appeared to 
have moved back and forth between firms, and we excluded such cases. To further reduce the possibility 
of misclassifying firm name changes or acquisitions as instances of mobility, we manually inspected 
algorithm-identified mobility events.  
Since our dependent variable is the likelihood of R&D alliance formation between ventures, our 
analyses required sampling on realized alliances between ventures and constructing a set of corresponding 
counterfactuals that were potential, yet unrealized alliances. For each realized alliance deal, we 
constructed the set of unrealized alliance deals by considering all biotech ventures from the population of 
firms in the Cortellis database that fulfilled the same screening criteria used for sampling alliance deals, 
namely firms that (a) were performing their primary business activity in the biotechnology industry at the 
time of the focal realized alliance deal, (b) had their location in the US, and (c) five years prior to the 
focal alliance had at least one patent reported in the US Patent Inventor Database. This procedure 
generated a comprehensive set of unrealized alliance deals and enabled us to exploit heterogeneity in the 
sample for testing the hypotheses in an unbiased way when a priori knowledge about the likelihood of an 
R&D alliance in a dyad is unavailable (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). We also made additional adjustments 
for acquisitions, because biotech firms are frequent takeover targets (e.g., Grigoriou and Rothaermel 
2017). In particular, if one firm in the sample acquired another one, the acquired firm was dropped from 
the sample in the year of acquisition. After matching realized and potential alliance dyads, we obtained a 
resulting dataset of 234,786 dyads of which 506 are realized R&D alliances. These alliance dyads in the 
final sample involved a total of 751 ventures. 
Finally, we obtained founding date and location information for each firm in our sample from 
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corporate websites, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, online platforms such as 
zoominfo.com and manta.com, as well as news articles. 
Dependent Variable 
We investigate the likelihood that two ventures in the biotechnology industry engage in an R&D alliance 
with each other. Therefore, our dependent variable, R&D Alliance Formation, is dyadic and dichotomous, 
and equals 1 for realized alliances and 0 for unrealized alliances between two ventures in year t.  
Independent Variables 
Our independent variable Scientist Mobility is also a dichotomous measure that takes on the value of 1 if a 
scientist mobility event occurred between the two firms in a dyad during the period of five years from t-5 
to t-1, where t is a year of a focal alliance deal, and 0 otherwise (Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010). We 
introduce the one-year lag in this variable to alleviate concerns of endogeneity in our analyses, and below 
we address several additional steps taken to mitigate and investigate this concern. The sample we exploit 
is based on unique dyads meaning that, for all observations, the specification of a firm as either the first or 
the second partner in a realized or unrealized alliance dyad makes no difference for any of the variables. 
Hence, our mobility variable also accounts for scientists’ movements in either of the two possible 
directions in a dyad.  
In Hypothesis 1, we posit that the positive effect of scientist mobility on R&D alliance formation 
will be more pronounced when the firms in a prospective alliance dyad lack relational ties. We thus 
constructed the variable Absence of Ties which takes on a value of 1 if firms in a dyad have no direct or 
indirect (i.e. shared third-party) interfirm alliances during the five years prior to the focal R&D alliance, 
and 0 otherwise. 
In Hypothesis 2, we propose that the positive effect of scientist mobility on R&D alliance 
formation becomes stronger when potential R&D partners are not geographically colocated. For the 
variable Absence of Colocation we used a binary indicator variable which takes on a value of 1 if the 
headquarters of both prospective R&D alliance partners are not located in the same state of the United 
States, and 0 otherwise.  
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In supplemental analyses described below, we carry out a number of robustness checks for these 
variables such as employing alternative time lags, measurement windows, and econometric specifications. 
Control Variables 
We introduced a set of controls that could be related to the likelihood of R&D collaboration as well as the 
cooperative context of a potential collaboration. Because firms with overlapping technologies might be 
more likely to engage in R&D collaboration, we controlled for Technology Similarity, measured as the 
number of the two firms’ overlapping technological niches, as proxied by patent classes at the three-digit 
level, divided by the total number of distinct technological niches of the prospective alliance partners 
(Mowery et al. 1996; Stuart and Podolny 1996). The measure is based on the past five years of firms’ 
patenting activities. 
Alliance activity of a firm might shape the resources to which it has access and might also convey 
to prospective R&D partners that its resources are in demand by other organizations (Stuart et al. 1999).  
Previous alliance partners have carried out evaluations of the firm’s resources and capabilities (Hitt et al. 
2004) and are involved in the operations of the firm (Almeida et al. 2002). In addition, prospective 
partners that have already engaged in collaborations might be more effective in engaging in new alliance 
activities (Hoang and Rothaermel 2005). We therefore incorporated the variable Alliance Experience, 
measured as the log-transformed value of the average number of alliances formed by two partners in a 
dyad during the period of five years prior to the focal alliance deal. 
For new ventures, their prior technological achievements can convey information about their 
technological resources and prospects (Stuart 2000). To account for the patenting records of prospective 
partners as an indication of their technological achievements, we created the variable Patents, measured 
as the log-transformed value of the average number of patents granted to two firms in a dyad during the 
period of five year prior to the focal R&D alliance (Agarwal et al. 2009). 
Further, the availability of information about a firm can also depend on its age. While the 
technology of a young startup might be attractive to prospective partners, it could also present greater 
uncertainty given its short track record (Nicholson et al. 2005; Stuart et al. 1999) or lack of reliability and 
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accountability in its business (Hannan and Freeman 1989). We measured firm age as the number of years 
from firm founding until the year of a particular realized or unrealized alliance deal, and then created the 
variable Age by log-transforming the average age of the two firms in a dyad.  
We incorporated different types of fixed effects to account for other sources of unobserved effects.  
We included Therapeutic Area Effects to control for the effect related to the therapeutic area of the focal 
R&D alliance. Further, we defined Patent Class Effects to control for whether firms in a dyad patented in 
particular three-digit technology classes that might affect R&D alliance formation (Jaffe 1989; Jaffe et al. 
1993). We added Year Effects to capture temporal trends that might affect firms’ decisions regarding 
R&D alliance formation. Finally, we incorporated Firm State Effects and Partner State Effects to control 
for attractiveness of the location in which the prospective partners reside (i.e. state of headquarters).  
Empirical Approach and Identification Strategy 
Unobserved heterogeneity surrounding the mobility of scientists could potentially account for our 
findings regarding the contingent effects of scientist mobility on R&D alliance formation. For example, 
certain strategic intents of a firm, for instance technological repositioning (Kogut and Zander 1992), could 
potentially affect both the recruitment or layoff of scientists (Tzabbar 2009) and the firm’s engagement in 
R&D alliances (Mowery et al. 1996). We therefore accounted for the endogeneity of scientist mobility by 
using a two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) estimation method, which is a particularly suitable approach 
for correcting endogeneity bias in nonlinear models that involve dichotomous dependent variables (Rivers 
and Vuong 1988; Terza 2018; Terza et al. 2008). The 2SRI involves specification of a maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation method, which helps capture the nonlinearity in the dependent variables and 
the endogenous regressor, and thereby mitigates a specification error (Nakamura and Nakamura 1998; 
Wooldridge 2014). More importantly, the 2SRI involves the inclusion of residuals from first stage ML 
estimation of the endogenous regressor in the second stage conditional ML estimation of the dependent 
variable (Blundell and Powell 2004; Newey 1987; Rivers and Vuong 1988; Terza 2018). The inclusion of 
residuals from the first-stage regression substitutes for unobservable confounders and therefore helps 
better account for endogeneity of the regressors (e.g., Terza et al., 2008; Wooldridge, 2014; Geraci et al., 
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2018). Terza et al. (2008) have demonstrated the superiority of 2SRI in addressing endogeneity in 
nonlinear models over the extension of the 2SLS estimator to nonlinear models. Specifically, they showed 
that for nonlinear models, the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator is not consistent, whereas the 2SRI 
estimator is. Terza (2018) recently also offered further guidance as well as a step-by-step protocol for the 
implementation of the 2SRI approach. 
Following this approach, we developed a first stage logit model in which we predicted the 
likelihood of scientist mobility between firms in a potential alliance dyad. This model included all our 
independent and control variables as well as additional exclusion restrictions. Relying on research in 
urban and labor economics that suggests safety and weather conditions affect labor mobility (e.g., 
Andrienko and Guriev 2004; Malecki and Bradbury 1992; Quigley and Weinberg 1977; Rappaport 2007), 
we used crime rates from the FBI database and WalletHub’s weather conditions as exclusion restrictions. 
We expected a high crime rate in the scientist’s potential destination location to decrease scientist 
mobility to that location, whereas we expected favorable weather conditions to increase the movement of 
scientists to that location. As mentioned above, in our dyad-level sample, the specification of a firm as 
either the first or the second partner in a dyad is arbitrary and makes no difference for any of the 
variables. Accordingly, our scientist mobility variable captures movements of scientists in either of the 
two directions between prospective partners. To accommodate such a study design, we included two 
exclusion restriction variables referring to the differences in the crime rates and in the weather conditions 
in the locations of the alliance partners. To check for the strength of our exclusion restrictions, we ran the 
first stage with and without exclusion restrictions, and we found a significant difference in model fit when 
we include these variables. Crime rates and weather ranking in the scientists’ potential destination 
location appeared strong exclusion restriction variables with high joint significance in the first stage 
model (p < 0.01) (Bascle 2008). Also, none of our exclusion restriction variables appeared correlated with 
the residuals associated with the dependent variable in the second-stage regression – R&D alliance 
formation (r = -0.001; r = - 0.002, respectively; p > 0.20 for both exclusion restrictions) (Semadeni et al. 
2014). Further, the overidentifying restrictions test statistic suggested that we cannot reject the null that 
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the instruments are exogenous (Cameron and Trivedi 2005). The results of the first-stage model are 
presented in Table 1. We obtained Residuals from this model and included them as an additional control 
variable in the second stage model predicting R&D alliance formation.  
For the second-stage models of R&D alliance formation, we specified logistic regressions since our 
dependent variable is also of a dichotomous nature. We accounted for dyadic dependence due to the 
repeated occurrence of firms as well as for autocorrelation stemming from repeated occurrence of dyads 
in multiple years. Specifically, we estimated robust standard errors that are clustered on three dimensions 
including the firm dyad and the two potential alliance partners (Cameron et al. 2011). We implemented 
three-way clustering of standard errors using the cluster.vcov function in the multiwayvcov package in R 
(Graham et al. 2016). 
Results 
Table 1 provides a correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. As expected, a moderate correlation is 
present between partners’ alliance experience and patents as well as between partners’ average age and 
patents. Omitting any of these control variables, however, does not affect our findings presented below. 
Moreover, the maximum variance inflation factor across the models is 1.72, well below the recommended 
critical cutoff level of 10 (Neter et al. 1996), suggesting that there are no multicollinearity concerns 
evident for our models. As for the summary statistics, there are some differences across the realized and 
unrealized alliance dyads for the main theoretical variables. For instance, in the set of realized alliances, 
7.11% of dyads experienced at least one scientist mobility event in the period of five years prior to the 
focal alliance, whereas in the set of unrealized alliances, only 0.38% of dyads had such instances of 
scientist mobility (p < 0.01). Relational ties between prospective alliance partners are absent in 80.43% of 
dyads in the set of realized alliances, and in 98.63% of dyads in the set of unrealized alliances (p < 0.01). 
Firms in our sample originate in 34 different US states, comprising 802 unique state-dyads. Figure 1 in 
Appendix A shows the distribution of firms across the US states. Whereas prospective collaboration 
partners were not colocated in 75.49% of realized alliances, the absence of colocation is higher with 
81.42% of dyads in the set of unrealized alliances (p < 0.01).  
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*** Insert Table 1 here *** 
The results of logistic regression models analyzing the probability of R&D alliance formation are 
presented in Table 2. Following Hoetker (2007), we report coefficient estimates, standard errors and 
marginal effects. Model 1 is a baseline specification including control variables only. The multivariate 
estimation results are in line with research which suggests that scientist mobility increases the probability 
of alliance formation between the two firms (p < 0.01) (Wagner and Goossen 2018). The marginal effect 
of scientist mobility on R&D alliance formation suggests that scientist mobility between firms increases 
the likelihood of R&D alliance formation between them by approximately 0.2% (1.0% in the full model), 
when variables are at sample averages, which is comparable to the marginal effects reported in Wagner 
and Goossen (2018). These results demonstrate the generalizability of the scientist mobility effect across 
various settings. 
The baseline results for other variables are also in line with work on alliance formation. We find 
significant and negative effect for the absence of ties variable (p < 0.01) (e.g., Ahuja 2000b; Gulati 
1995a). Moreover, when prospective partners are not colocated they are less likely to engage in an 
alliance (p < 0.10) (e.g., Reuer and Lahiri 2013). Firms with similar technological knowledge are also 
more likely to engage in an alliance (p < 0.01) (e.g., Chung et al. 2000). Also, firms experienced in 
interfirm collaboration are more likely to engage in future alliances (p < 0.01) (Stuart et al. 1999). We 
also note that the coefficient of residuals which we included in the model to address endogeneity is 
significant (p < 0.01), indicating that unobserved factors surrounding the mobility of scientists could also 
affect alliance formation. These results suggest that controlling for endogeneity is indeed important in 
investigating the impact of scientist mobility on firm-level outcomes (Tzabbar 2009). 
*** Insert Table 2 here *** 
Models 2 and 3 report the results of logistic regressions analyzing the hypothesized interaction 
effects, and Model 4 is the full model that contains both interaction effects estimated at once. Hypothesis 
1 suggests that the positive effect of scientist mobility on R&D alliance formation will be more 
pronounced when prospective partners lack relational ties. In line with this hypothesis, the coefficient 
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estimate of the interaction between Absence of Ties and Scientist Mobility in Model 2 is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 proposes that the positive effect of scientist mobility on R&D alliance 
formation will be more pronounced when the parties are not colocated. Consistent with expectations, in 
Model 3 the coefficient estimate of the interaction between Absence of Colocation and Scientist Mobility 
is also positive and significant (p < 0.05), thus furnishing support to Hypothesis 2. Both interaction 
coefficients in the full model, Model 4, yield consistent interpretations.  
To further interpret the interaction effects, we plotted them graphically in Figures 1-2. In Figure 1, 
we depict the average marginal effects of scientist mobility with respect to relational ties between 
potential partners. The bars surrounding the line denote the 95% confidence intervals. In line with the 
regression estimates, Figure 1 illustrates that the effect of scientist mobility is stronger when prospective 
partners have no ties. The calculation of the corresponding average marginal effects suggests that average 
marginal effect of scientist mobility on the likelihood of R&D alliance formation increases eight-fold in 
the absence of ties. In Figure 2, we depict the average marginal effects of scientist mobility with respect 
to whether potential partners are colocated, indicating that the effect of scientist mobility on the likelihood 
of R&D alliance formation is more pronounced for prospective partners that are not colocated. The 
marginal effect of scientist mobility on the likelihood of R&D alliance formation increases almost three-
fold for partners that are not colocated. Taken together, these results provide evidence that the effects of 
scientist mobility are particularly important for firms that have not developed ties or are not colocated 
with prospective alliance partners. Scientist mobility that is effected through labor markets and the 
cooperative context providing ties to other firms and proximity thus appear to be substitutive in fostering 
R&D alliances. Moreover, the confidence intervals indicate the strength of this substitution effect in that 
scientist mobility becomes insignificant in effecting R&D alliance formation for firms that have prior ties 
or that are colocated. 
*** Insert Figures 1-2 *** 
Supplementary Analyses 
We also carried out a number of supplementary analyses. We first examined whether our findings extend 
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to alternative measures of our key explanatory variables. Whereas in the main analyses we capture prior 
ties using a dummy variable, we also constructed a continuous measure capturing the number of prior 
direct and indirect ties between the prospective alliance partners during the period of five years preceding 
the focal alliance. The interpretation of our main findings remained the same. Similarly, we constructed 
an alternative measure of absence of colocation – a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
geographical distance between the prospective partners is more than 50 miles, and 0 otherwise. In 
calculating the distance between the headquarters of the two firms in the dyad, we used zip codes to 
determine the latitude and longitude of the firms, and we applied the great circle distance formula. Also, 
we created a continuous variable measuring the geographical distance in miles between the headquarter 
locations of prospective partners in a dyad. In both cases, the interpretation of our main findings remained 
the same. We also assessed whether our results extend to alternative measures for the scientist mobility 
variable, using time windows such as seven or ten years (e.g., Tzabbar 2009). We found that the 
interaction effects of scientist mobility and the absence of ties (or absence of colocation) on R&D alliance 
formation remain positive and significant.   
In another set of analyses, we examined whether our results are robust to alternative sampling 
approaches featured in the literature on alliance formation (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). To exploit 
heterogeneity in the sample for testing our hypotheses, our main sample was constructed by creating all 
the possible counterfactuals for a given realized alliance. However, we also wanted to ensure the 
robustness of our results to different draws of counterfactuals. For each realized alliance, we randomly 
selected counterfactuals to obtain different ratios between unrealized and realized dyads, such as 20:1 and 
50:1. Through these analyses we obtained results consistent to our main results. 
To further examine the sensitivity of the results to the estimation approach employed, we also 
employed the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression. The results from both the first and second stage 
models were consistent with those obtained by 2SRI (see Appendix B). Specifically, with respect to the 
exclusion restrictions in the first stage, we found that the F-statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic) 
for weak instruments is 26.49 and above the Stock-Yogo cut-off value at the 5% level (13.46) for weak 
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instrument bias (Stock and Yogo, 2002). The Hansen J statistic was 0.002 (p = 0.96), suggesting that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. Together, these tests provided additional assurances that the 
instruments are valid. Further, the underidentification test statistic (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) was 
14.51 and significant (p < 0.001), indicating that the instruments are not irrelevant. However, the 
parameter estimates in the 2SLS suggest a downward bias when we compare these results with estimates 
in our main analyses from the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) procedure. While our substantive 
interpretations do not change, this pattern is consistent with previous conclusions that 2SLS can be an 
incorrect specification in the context of limited dependent variable models with endogenous regressors 
such as ours (Hausman 1978; Rivers and Vuong 1988; Smith and Blundell 1986) and that the two-stage 
residual approach is a superior method to control for endogeneity in nonlinear regressions frameworks 
(Blundell and Powell 2004; Newey 1987; Rivers and Vuong 1988; Terza et al. 2008; Wooldridge 2014). 
Finally, while in our main analyses we employed a two-stage residual inclusion approach to 
address the potential endogeneity of scientist mobility, in additional analyses we also utilized matching 
estimators (see Appendix C1 and C2). To that end, we performed treatment effect analyses based on 
propensity-score matching (PSM) and inverse-probability weighting (IPW) (Morgan and Winship 2015) 
using teffects in Stata. These techniques help control for the potential non-randomness of a treatment 
variable and obtain a quasi-experimental setup via the construction of observations, with and without the 
treatment, respectively, that are comparable to each other on observed covariates that potentially 
influence the treatment and outcome variables (Gangl 2014). In the PSM approach (using teffects 
psmatch), we first estimated a propensity score for scientist mobility which is the treatment of interest in 
our study, by specifying a logistic regression and using other covariates that can predict both scientist 
mobility and R&D alliance formation between potential partners (i.e. relational ties, colocation, 
technology similarity, alliance experience, patents, age, and various fixed effects). Treated and control 
groups were identified using nearest neighbor matching and estimated the average treatment effect of 
scientist mobility on R&D alliance formation. We implemented IPW (using teffects ipw in Stata) and used 
the inverse of propensity scores as weights in the second stage, and estimated the average treatment 
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effect. The results across these models demonstrate that the average treatment effect of scientist mobility 
on the likelihood of R&D alliance formation is positive and significant, and is also similar to results 
reported in Table 3. Finally, we also employed a doubly robust estimator using inverse-probability 
weights with regression adjustment (IPWRA) using teffects ipwra in Stata, as an additional robustness 
check (Wooldridge, 2010). In this approach, we estimated the treatment model for scientist mobility by 
implementing the first stage described in the 2SRI estimation, and we used inverse-probability weights in 
the second stage regression along with the set of covariates explaining R&D alliance formation (Morgan 
and Winship 2015). More importantly, as we are interested in the effects of scientist mobility in the 
absence of ties between partners and when partners are not colocated, we applied the matching estimator 
approaches to examine the average effects of scientist mobility in subsamples based on these two 
conditions. We found across both matching estimator approaches that the average treatment effect of 
scientist mobility is positive and significant when ties are absent between partners. By contrast, the effects 
are insignificant when ties are present between partners, suggesting that the role of scientist mobility in 
alliance formation becomes redundant for partners having previous alliances with each other. Similarly, 
we found that across both models the average treatment effect of scientist mobility is positive and 
significant for firms that are not colocated, while it is insignificant for those that are colocated, suggesting 
that scientist mobility is a useful mechanism for R&D partner selection for partners that are 
geographically apart. Taken together, these results provide additional support for our theoretical 
expectation on the positive role that scientist mobility plays in fostering R&D alliances between firms that 
lack relational ties or geographic colocation. 
Discussion 
Theoretical Implications 
Our study provides several contributions to the literatures on strategic alliances and mobility in the labor 
market for knowledge workers. Whereas previous alliance formation research has attended to the 
cooperative context of collaboration by emphasizing the role of prior organizational ties of various types 
(e.g., Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) and geographic colocation (e.g., Felzensztein et al. 2010; 
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Narula and Santangelo 2009), we submit that scientist mobility in the factor market is an aspect of the 
competitive context that not only shapes firms’ likelihood of engaging in R&D collaborations but also the 
implications of various interfirm ties and colocation. A focus on mobile scientists shows that their 
influence is highly interdependent with the well-known relational and geographic factors that characterize 
the cooperative context in which firms are embedded. Specifically, we argue and show scientist mobility 
might be especially important in providing collaboration opportunities for new high-tech ventures that 
lack extensive relational ties with other firms or are non-colocated (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; 
Hagedoorn 2002). This also indicates that as firms develop and are more embedded, the importance of 
scientist mobility for their R&D collaboration opportunities will diminish. 
Our results suggest that mobile scientists represent one important micro-foundation of R&D 
alliance formation between ventures in high-tech industries. We thus replicate and extend to a new 
domain recent research demonstrating the role of scientist mobility for alliance formation of large 
corporations (Wagner and Goossen 2018), and we answer recent calls for more research on micro-
foundations that fundamentally revolve around the impact of individuals on strategic decisions of firms 
(Felin et al. 2015). More broadly, we also answer multiple calls for research taking a cross-level 
perspective on interorganizational relationships (Lumineau and Oliveira 2018; Mawdsley and Somaya 
2016; Salvato et al. 2017) and advance this research in two important ways. First, we build upon and 
extend the scant research that has considered how ties between individual employees can influence ties at 
the interfirm level (Collet and Hedström 2013; Gulati and Westphal 1999). We thus add to the cross-level 
perspectives on the formation of alliances by showing how scientist mobility can play an important role in 
the development of inter-organizational ties (Hess and Rothaermel 2011; Wagner and Goossen 2018). 
Further, we show that scientist mobility and firm-level ties are alternative channels that are substitutive in 
facilitating interorganizational economic exchanges such as strategic alliances. Our study suggests that 
future research should consider the multiple ways that labor market mobility can affect other strategic 
transactions (e.g., acquisitions, international joint ventures, foreign direct investment, etc.).   
Our study also builds upon and extends research on the implications of labor market mobility in 
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several unique ways. Our work sheds light on an important outcome of labor market mobility between 
high-tech ventures that complements existing perspectives in this literature. Much of the extant research 
suggests that mobile scientists facilitate outcomes such as learning and knowledge transfer (Rosenkopf 
and Almeida 2003; Song et al. 2003). Loss of scientific human capital can therefore erode a firm’s 
competitive advantages and can be detrimental to high-tech ventures at an important stage in their 
development. At the same time, to the extent that information intermediation by mobile scientists can 
provide information advantages and reduce risks pertaining to prospective R&D alliances, our arguments 
and findings point to an unexamined potential benefit of scientist mobility between firms. We therefore 
provide further evidence that scientist mobility not only has important implications for learning and firm’s 
innovation strategies, as prior research has emphasized, but also strategy and specifically firms’ access to 
opportunities for external corporate development activities for firms that are less embedded. 
Moreover, recent research points to the limitations of mobility driven knowledge transfer in that it 
does not allow firms to access deeply buried know-how and skills in other firms. Specifically, the 
potential for knowledge transfer from scientist mobility may be limited due to knowledge being tacit and 
embedded within teams or organization structures (Palomeras and Melero 2010). Knowledge transfer can 
also be, highly contingent upon firm characteristics such as the firm’s knowledge integration capability 
and innovation intensity (Herstad et al. 2015) or the ability of a scientist to collaborate with new 
colleagues (Tzabbar and Kehoe 2014). In line with this research, our findings suggest that scientist 
mobility does not necessarily obviate the need for alliances but can promote R&D collaborations under 
specific conditions.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
In addition to the research possibilities already noted, extensions might pursue research opportunities 
presented by some of the specific limitations of this study. We placed our analysis in the context of R&D 
collaborations between ventures in the biotechnology industry. This focus partially reflects prior research 
on alliance formation and the information hazards that accompany transactions in this context 
(Rothaermel and Boeker 2008). While we would expect our findings to generalize to other high-tech 
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industries, ventures in other industries or at other stages of development might rely on other information 
conduits besides mobile scientists (e.g., board interlocks, relationships with financial intermediaries such 
as investment banks, etc.) and they may or may not substitute for scientist mobility. Similarly, since we 
investigate collaborating firms within the US, it would be worthwhile to examine alliance formation in 
international contexts where expatriate assignments, cross-border migration, and the return of employees 
to their countries of origin are common features of mobility. Such research could examine the potential 
limitations of mobility-driven learning and knowledge transfer as well as investigate whether mobility 
enhances the efficiency of R&D partnerships and other forms of collaboration. 
We have investigated whether and under what conditions scientist mobility affect high-tech 
ventures’ formation of alliances, yet we do not address the performance implications of scientist mobility 
for R&D alliances (Sampson 2007). In future research, it would therefore be valuable to examine whether 
and under what conditions the information intermediation role of mobile scientists actually reduces 
potential risks during the alliance formation process and improves subsequent alliance performance 
(Ahuja 2000a). Similarly, research on the informational advantages of mobile scientists might investigate 
other strategic outcomes such as innovation output, commercialization successes, and growth for 
individual partners and for their alliances.  
In our analysis of who partners with whom in the market for R&D collaborations, we have used 
sets of realized alliances and unrealized deals. This research design accommodates unrealized alliances as 
counterfactuals rather than sampling only upon completed transactions. However, this empirical approach 
is limited in not being able to provide direct insights into the actual decision processes through which 
high-tech ventures search for R&D partners, consider a set of potential partners, evaluate certain 
information, or make choices between prospective partners. Although there is some evidence from prior 
research on how scientists affect strategic decision processes (Liebeskind et al. 1996; Schweizer 2005; 
Wagner and Goossen 2018), it would be interesting and important to investigate such processes in a fine-
grained way using primary data from field surveys or longitudinal case studies and explore the role of 
executives, middle managers, scientists, legal staff, and other employees in these processes. We have 
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employed a set of econometric techniques to address potential endogeneity concerns surrounding the 
relationship between scientist mobility and R&D alliance formation, but we cannot draw definitive, 
causal effects from observational data such as ours, so it would also be valuable to use other 
methodologies to investigate the implications of scientist mobility for R&D collaborations (e.g., field 
experiments, natural experiments, etc.). 
Another empirical limitation of the study lies in the procedure for identifying the mobility events. 
While we followed the established procedure for tracking scientist mobility from publicly available patent 
data, we encourage future research that examines scientist mobility using other techniques or that 
considers the mobility of other employees and teams across organizations. For example, this work could 
examine how firms carry out acquihire strategies in different industries, and such transactions might 
substitute for a particular alliance or might open up new collaboration opportunities in the future. 
Although our data do not allow us to empirically examine this question, we were also interested more 
broadly in whether high-tech ventures consider hiring and partnering as substitutive choices for particular 
R&D projects. In interviews with executives at biotechnology firms, they indicated to us that they do not 
make decisions to hire versus partner, the reason being that the knowledge sought in partnerships is 
tightly tied to intellectual property contained in patents. It might be that in other industrial or national 
contexts, particularly those with weaker intellectual property regimes or in non-technology domains, 
firms make choices to hire versus partner for particular projects. Research in these directions will be able 
to investigate the impact of labor market mobility on firms’ collaborative strategies and consider how the 
functioning of labor markets and competition for knowledge workers might sow the seeds of broader 
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   Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (N = 234,786) 
 
 
Variables    Mean 
   Standard      
   deviation 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. R&D Alliance Formation 0.002 0.046         
2. Scientist Mobility 0.004 0.063 0.050        
3. Absence of Ties 0.985 0.117 -0.071 -0.142       
4. Absence of Colocation  0.814 0.389 -0.007 -0.040 0.015      
5. Technology Similarity 0.158 0.289 0.033 0.085 -0.122 -0.020     
6. Alliance Experience 0.659 0.660 0.044 0.090 -0.213 -0.017 0.206    
7. Patents 2.224 1.221 0.028 0.092 -0.122 -0.065 0.286 0.532   
8. Age 2.252 0.419 0.018 0.054 -0.097 0.060 0.202 0.425 0.460  
9. Residuals -0.966 0.630 0.032 0.219 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
                           
 




   Table 2. The First Stage Model of the Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) Model: 
                  Logit Estimates for Scientist Mobility 
  
Variables        Model 1 
  Absence of Ties -1.354*** 
 (0.124) 
 -0.889*** 
Absence of Colocation -1.600*** 
 (0.418) 
 -0.772*** 
Technology Similarity 1.687*** 
 (0.155) 
 0.663*** 









Weather Conditions 0.012*** 
 (0.003) 
 0.003*** 




Therapeutic Area Effects 53.447*** 
  
Patent Class Effects 1473.272*** 
  
Year Effects 245.189*** 
  
Firm State Effects 288.376*** 
  




N      234,786 
Log Likelihood -4235.472 
Chi-Squared 3695.588*** 
Notes. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Marginal effects, multiplied by 100 for easier interpretation, appear in italics.  






  Table 3. The Second Stage Model of the Two-Stage Residual Inclusion (2SRI) Model: 
                  Logit Estimates for R&D Alliance Formation 
  
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
     H1: Scientist Mobility x  1.743***  1.781*** 
       Absence of Ties  (0.398)  (0.400) 
  0.366***  0.375*** 
H2: Scientist Mobility x   0.912** 0.946** 
       Absence of Colocation   (0.421) (0.463) 
   0.185** 0.198** 
Scientist Mobility 0.864*** 1.748*** 1.015*** 1.921*** 
 (0.237) (0.252) (0.252) (0.269) 
 0.238*** 0.817*** 0.303*** 0.993*** 
Absence of Ties -1.288*** -1.487*** -1.291*** -1.491*** 
 (0.145) (0.140) (0.141) (0.139) 
 -0.406*** -0.523*** -0.405*** -0.525*** 
Absence of Colocation  -0.271* -0.265* -0.344** -0.334** 
 (0.158) (0.154) (0.152) (0.159) 
 -0.051* -0.049* -0.067** -0.067** 
Technology Similarity 0.832*** 0.836*** 0.823*** 0.830*** 
 (0.152) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 
Alliance Experience 1.168*** 1.149*** 1.172*** 1.152*** 
 (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
 0.226*** 0.241*** 0.243*** 0.242*** 
Patents 0.059 0.056 0.056 0.053 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) 
 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.018 
Age -0.123 -0.104 -0.129 -0.111 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.235) (0.235) 
 -0.044 -0.042 -0.044 -0.042 
Residuals 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Therapeutic Area Effects 2.832 2.417 2.996 2.388 
     
Patent Class Effects 249.212*** 247.047*** 248.101*** 247.540*** 
     
Year Effects 39.018*** 38.239*** 38.553*** 38.858*** 
     
Firm State Effects 158.660*** 158.283*** 158.219*** 158.202*** 
     
Partner State Effects 119.297*** 121.040*** 120.653*** 120.808*** 
     
Intercept -18.611*** -19.877*** -18.779*** -20.028*** 
 (1.359) (1.652) (1.652) (1.108) 
N 234,786 234,786 234,786 234,786 
Log Likelihood -3131.300 -3120.902 -3126.751 -3116.034 
Chi-Squared 961.879*** 982.676*** 968.978*** 988.412*** 
 
Notes. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Marginal effects, multiplied by 100 for easier interpretation, appear in italics.  





Figure 1. Marginal Effects (with 95% Confidence Intervals)  





Figure 2. Marginal Effects (with 95% Confidence Intervals)  
















































Appendix B. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimation Results 
 
Variables OLS first 
Stage 
2SLS 
(using ivreg2 in STATA) 
      
Scientist Mobility x  
Absence of Colocation 




Scientist Mobility x 
Absence of Ties 




Scientist Mobility  0.064** 0.074** 0.069** 0.083* 
  (0.030) (0.039) (0.033) (0.049) 
Weather Conditions 0.004***     
 (0.000)     
Crime Rates -0.001***     
 (0.000)     
Absence of Ties -0.061*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.016*** 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Absence of Colocation -0.009*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Technology Similarity 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Alliance Experience 0.005** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Patents 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000) 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Therapeutic Area Effects 2.37* 16.71* 11.90 10.68 11.71 
Patent Class Effects 6.89*** 17.27* 17.30* 17.00* 17.32* 
Year Effects 24.37*** 43.59*** 42.81*** 42.92*** 42.89*** 
Firm State Effects 50.86*** 102.00*** 146.38*** 106.71*** 165.50*** 
Partner State Effects 130.60*** 127.74*** 226.14*** 240.06*** 238.26*** 
Intercept 0.063*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
N 234,786 234,786 234,786 234,786 234,786 
R-squared 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 
Notes. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 






































Panel (a) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
PSM P > z  IPW P > z IPWRA P > z 







95% CI [0.002, 0.176] [0.022, 0.161] [0.025, 0.163] 
Panel (b) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 PSM P > z IPW P > z IPWRA P > z 







95% CI [0.021, 0.163] [0.021, 0.163] [0.030, 0.173] 
 







95% CI [-0.022, 0.013] [-0.018, 0.068] [-0.016, 0.073] 
Panel (c)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 PSM P > z IPW P > z IPWRA P > z 







95% CI [0.019, 0.178] [0.020, 0.238] [0.034, 0.232] 
 







95% CI [-0.006, 0.017] [-0.008, 0.031] [-0.030, 0.073] 
